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During the recent financial 
turmoil, many press accounts blamed 
short-selling for declines in stock prices 
and even for the collapse of some 
firms. Regulators in many countries 
responded by restricting or banning 
short-sales. This critical attitude to 
short-selling has been a feature of 
many financial crises, including the 
stock market crash of 1929 and even 
the collapse of the South Sea bubble 
in 1720. 
hort-selling, the practice of selling a security 
the seller does not own, is done in an attempt 
to profit from an expected decline in the price 
of the security. During the recent financial 
turmoil, many press accounts blamed short-selling for 
declines in stock prices and even for the collapse of some 
firms. in this article, Ronel elul discusses the issue of 
short-selling. he notes that research has shown that short-
selling plays a valuable role in setting accurate prices for 
securities but that it can also be used to facilitate market 
manipulation. This latter consideration may provide 
justification for restricting short-sales under certain 
circumstances. 
1 This is not the only way to profit from declines 
in the price of an asset. Depending on the 
security in question, an investor may also be 
able to enter into a short futures contract, 
which locks in the price at some future date, or 
to buy a put option, which allows the holder of 
this option to sell an asset at a specified price in 
the future. in either of these cases, the investor 
will profit if the market price ends up below the 
price he has locked in.
Short-selling, or “shorting,” is the 
practice of selling a security or other 
financial instrument the seller does 
not own, in the hope of repurchasing 
it later at a lower price. This is done in 
an attempt to profit from an expected 
decline in the price of the security.1 
Since the investor does not own 
the security he is shorting, he must 
typically borrow (or, rather, “rent”) it 
from someone who does own it. Thus, 
short-selling is closely linked to the 
securities lending market. 
economists who have studied 
short-selling have shown that it plays 
a valuable role in setting accurate 
prices for securities and in aggregating 
dispersed information. however, they 
have also shown that it can be used 
to facilitate market manipulation. 
This may provide a justification for 
restricting short-sales under certain 
circumstances.
KEY FEATURES OF A TYPICAL 
SHORT-SALE 
Suppose that shares in highflier, 
inc. currently sell for $10 a share. 
An investor believes that the stock is 
overvalued and would like to profit 
from this by selling highflier short. 
he borrows 100 shares and then 
immediately sells them for a total of 
$1000. This transaction is typically 
intermediated through the investor’s 
brokerage house, which buys and sells 
the securities on his behalf and also 
often arranges the loan of the shares. 
if the investor is correct and 
the price later falls to $8 a share, the 
investor would then buy 100 shares 
back for $800, return the shares to 
their original owner, and make a $200 
profit (minus the transaction fees for 
borrowing the shares). This practice 
has the potential for losses as well. For 
example, if the shares of highflier in 
fact went up to $25, the short-seller 
would have to buy back all of the 
shares at $2500, losing $1500.2 
2 Since the lender often retains the right to 
“recall” the security, as discussed below, the 
short-seller may not be able to wait for the price 
to go back down.12   Q2  2009 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
Margin Requirements. The 
short-seller cannot simply pocket 
the $1000 he receives from selling 
the stock. Rather, Federal Reserve 
Regulation T requires the short-
seller to deposit 150 percent of the 
proceeds into his margin account. in 
our example, this means the $1000 
proceeds of the short-sale, together 
with another $500 (in cash or 
securities). This margin is designed to 
protect the broker from losses due to 
failure by the short-seller to return the 
security.3 in addition to this purchase 
margin, most exchanges also impose 
a maintenance margin of 25 percent; 
that is, at any point in time, the value 
of the margin account must be at least 
125 percent of the current value of the 
securities that have been borrowed. 
For example, if the stock price rises 
to $13 per share, the short-seller 
would need to add another $125 to 
his margin account in order to meet 
the maintenance margin requirement 
and avoid having his position closed 
out.4 These margin requirements are 
costly, since the money cannot be used 
for other purposes and the short-seller 
often does not accrue any interest 
on his margin account. (A valued 
customer might receive some interest, 
but typically it will be at below-market 
rates.) 
The Securities Lending Market. 
Where are the borrowed shares 
obtained? in the simplest case, the 
brokerage houses may be able to lend 
other customers’ shares, when those 
customers have bought their stock on 
margin.5  if the broker does not have 
the particular security in its inventory, 
however, it must turn to outside 
sources. institutional investors such 
as mutual funds, pension funds, and 
insurance companies often lend shares 
in their portfolios to short-sellers.6  
This is particularly attractive for them, 
since they generally do not anticipate 
needing to sell those shares. however, 
they typically retain the right to 
“recall” the shares at any time.7  
The borrowed shares do not come 
free. The broker will deposit part of 
the margin that the short-seller posted 
as collateral with the lender. The 
interest rate received on this collateral 
is typically below market interest rates, 
and this represents the opportunity 
cost of borrowing the security. This 
cost is borne by the short-seller 
because it reduces the interest he 
receives on the cash in his margin 
account (if any). Moreover, if the cost 
of borrowing shares is sufficiently high, 
not only will the short-seller receive no 
interest, but he may actually have to 
pay a fee to borrow the securities.
christopher Geczy, David Musto, 
and Adam Reed document costs in the 
securities lending market. They find 
that if the security is not in particular 
demand by short-sellers, the difference 
between the market interest rate and 
that paid on the collateral is small 
(typically less than 20 basis points). 
however, if the security is in high 
demand, the cost of  borrowing it may 
be rather high; that is, the interest rate 
received by the short-seller will be very 
low. in this case the stock is said to be 
“on special.” Geczy, Musto, and Reed 
find that, on average, about 7 percent 
of stocks are on special at any one 
time. For example, companies involved 
in mergers often tend to be expensive 
to short.8 in addition, new issues 
(iPOs) are also not infrequently on 
special. Furthermore, sometimes it may 
be virtually impossible to borrow the 
shares of a particular company – which 
makes short-selling infeasible.9 This 
inability to short-sell may occasionally 
lead to a striking mispricing of these 
stocks, as we discuss below.
Naked Short-Selling. According 
to the Securities and exchange 
commission’s (Sec) regulation ShO, 
Institutional investors such as mutual 
funds and pension funds often lend shares 
in their portfolios to short-sellers.
3 This is most likely to occur if the price of the 
stock goes up, since, in that case, the short-
seller would need to come up with additional 
cash in order to close out his position.
4 Since he initially deposited $1500 in his 
margin account, and the securities he has 
borrowed are now worth $1300 (so the margin 
requirement is 125 percent of this, or $1625).
5 buying on margin means borrowing money 
(typically from one’s broker) in order to buy 
securities. The securities thus purchased remain 
in the buyer’s margin account, since they serve 
as collateral for the loan and so are available to 
the broker for lending.
6 This is typically done through “custodian 
banks,” which hold the institutional investors’ 
shares.
7 Pension funds and mutual funds are in 
fact required to retain the right to recall the 
securities, according to the provisions of the 
employee Retirement income Security Act 
(eRiSA) and the investment company Act, 
respectively. 
8 in particular, the acquiring company is often 
on special. The reason is that a standard 
“merger arbitrage” strategy —  often practiced 
by hedge funds — involves buying shares of 
the target and shorting shares of the acquirer 
(since in a successful merger the target’s shares 
commonly rise, and the acquirer’s fall).
9 This may occur particularly for certain new 
issues. One reason is that the underwriters 
(the investment banks that helped issue the 
stock) are not permitted to lend out the stock 
for 30 days following the iPO. Also, many iPOs 
involve the issue of a relatively modest amount 
of shares.  Business Review  Q2  2009   13 www.philadelphiafed.org
a broker-dealer10 cannot accept a short-
sale order unless he has “reasonable 
grounds” for believing that the security 
can be borrowed; this is known as 
“locating” the stock.11 but what if the 
short-seller has not actually located 
the shares? Or does not actually 
borrow those shares (because they are 
expensive)? This is known as naked 
short-selling. Such a strategy may be 
attractive if the shares are difficult 
(i.e., expensive) to borrow. if the 
short-seller obtains and delivers the 
shares by the settlement date (within 
three days of the sale, in the U.S.), the 
naked short-sale is essentially invisible. 
A naked short-sale may become 
apparent, however, if the short-seller 
fails to deliver the stock in time, either 
by design or due to circumstances 
beyond his control. Failing to deliver 
imposes two costs on the short-seller. 
First, the seller does not receive the 
sale proceeds (and so forgoes interest). 
Second, if the buyer demands the 
physical shares, the seller may be 
“bought in” immediately.12 That is, 
the security will be purchased on the 
open market by the broker on behalf of 
the buyer (typically at an unattractive 
price). 
Since naked short-selling can, in 
principle, lead to the level of short-
selling exceeding the actual number of 
shares outstanding, some executives of 
troubled companies have charged that 
it can also facilitate manipulation.13 As 
discussed below, the Sec has sought 
to restrict naked short-selling in recent 
years.
On the other hand, in some cases 
naked short-selling can in fact facilitate 
market liquidity. Market makers14 
in particular will often engage in a 
modest amount of naked short-selling, 
since they must stand ready to sell 
shares even if there is a limited supply 
of those shares. in recognition of their 
role, market makers are exempt from 
some of the requirements to locate a 
lender before shorting a stock. 
REGULATING SHORT-SALES
We have referred to short-sale 
restrictions, but what form do these 
regulations take in practice?      
History of Short-Sale Regula-
tion. Among the first countries to 
restrict short-sales was holland,15 
which banned them in 1610, following 
the collapse of shares in the east india 
company. This pattern — the collapse 
of a share-price bubble followed by at-
tempts to prohibit short-selling — has 
repeated itself many times. in another 
example, england banned short-sales 
in 1733, following the collapse of the 
South Sea bubble.16 
in the United States, the 
stock market crash of 1929 led to 
public attacks on short-sellers, a 
strident defense by the new york 
Stock exchange,17 many years of 
congressional hearings, and new 
regulation. One example of this new 
regulation was the Federal Reserve’s 
power to set margin requirements.  
Another important regulation 
first adopted during that period 
was the uptick rule, which restricted 
short-selling to taking place only at an 
“uptick,” that is, at a price above the 
previous trade’s price.18 That is, short-
selling was not permitted in a falling 
market. The uptick rule was adopted 
by the Sec in 1938 and remained in 
force until 2007. it was a response to 
allegations that bear raids contributed 
to the 1929 crash. A bear raid is a 
strategy in which a trader (or group 
of traders) attempts to force down the 
In the United States, the stock market 
crash of 1929 led to public attacks on 
short-sellers, a strident defense by the 
New York Stock Exchange, many years of 
congressional hearings, and new regulation. 
10 A broker-dealer is a company or other 
organization that trades securities for its own 
account or on behalf of its customers. Although 
many broker-dealers are independent firms 
solely involved in providing broker-dealer 
services, others are business units or subsidiaries 
of commercial banks, investment banks, or 
investment companies.
11 The “locate” rules were originally instituted 
by the various exchanges. in 2004 the Sec 
adopted Regulation ShO, which instituted a 
uniform locate requirement, and as discussed 
below, the Sec has recently tightened these 
rules further.
12 See the paper by Richard evans, christopher 
Geczy, David Musto, and Adam Reed for more 
details on fails and buy-ins.
13 This criticism of short-selling was also made 
following the crash of 1929 (see the book by 
J. edward Meeker). See also the discussion of 
Owen lamont’s paper, below.
14 A market maker is an individual or firm that 
quotes prices for a security and stands ready 
to buy and sell (modest amounts) for its own 
account on a regular basis at those prices. 
Market makers in equity options also sometimes 
short-sell the underlying stock, to either hedge 
or close out a position.
15 See the book by Meeker for further discussion 
of the history of short-sale regulations up until 
the 1930s.
16 The law remained in force until 1820 but had 
little effect on actual market practice.
17 in particular, Meeker (who was economist 
to the new york Stock exchange) explicitly 
dedicated his 1932 book to the defense of short-
selling. 
18 More precisely, a short-sale was permitted 
at the same price as the previous trade if that 
previous trade itself represented an uptick. 14   Q2  2009 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
price of a stock, for example, to cover 
a short position. This can be done by 
spreading negative rumors about the 
target, or alternatively, the traders 
take on very large short positions, 
with the large volume of selling itself 
causing the price to fall. Allegations of 
bear raids have also been made in the 
current financial crisis.19 even the Sec 
cited the “market impact of rumors” 
preceding the collapse of bear Stearns 
in enacting its short-sale restrictions in 
2008.
Recent Restrictions on Naked 
Short-Selling and Failures to Deliver. 
in recent years, the Sec has enacted 
rules to restrict naked short-selling 
and failures to deliver. Regulation 
ShO (enacted in 2004) instituted 
a requirement for short-sellers — 
other than market makers — to be 
reasonably certain that they have 
“located” a lender of the stock. in 
2008, in response to the financial 
crisis, these regulations were tightened 
further. currently, they (i) require 
short-sellers in 19 financial stocks to 
actually enter into an agreement to 
borrow shares before short-selling,20 (ii) 
explicitly prohibit market participants 
from deceiving others regarding their 
ability to borrow or deliver stock by 
the settlement date,21 and (iii) require 
all “fails” to be closed out on the first 
trading day following the settlement 
date.22 
Other Recent Restrictions. 
During the recent financial turmoil, 
many countries have instituted 
outright bans on short-selling stock. 
in the U.S., on September 19, 2008, 
the Sec temporarily prohibited 
short-selling for nearly 1000 stocks 
whose business related in some way 
to the financial sector.23 The ban 
was unpopular and was allowed to 
expire after less than a month. Many 
other countries also banned short-
sales of at least some stocks around 
the same time.24 The Sec also 
recently instituted a requirement that 
investment managers (including hedge 
funds) must report their short-sales.25 
Another outcome of the current 
crisis has been a decline in the amount 
of securities available for borrowing. 
Some institutional investors have 
announced that they have curtailed 
securities lending programs, either 
because of bad publicity (from 
accusations that short-sellers were 
manipulating financial stocks) or 
because of losses realized from their 
lending activities.26 
THE POSITIVE ROLE OF 
SHORT-SALES 
Despite the public appetite for 
short-sale regulations, economists 
have shown that short-sales play an 
important role in financial markets 
and that restricting them may have 
negative effects.
Short-Sale Constraints and 
Overvaluation. One of the first to 
argue that  restricting short-sales can 
lead to overvaluation of securities 
was edward M. Miller. in particular, 
Miller showed that if short-selling is 
restricted and investors have different 
opinions about the underlying value of 
the security, its price does not reflect 
the beliefs of all potential investors but 
only the opinion of the most optimistic 
ones. This, he argued, will tend to 
bias the price of the stock upward. 
The reason is that those investors who 
value the stock less are limited in their 
ability to act on their beliefs when 
short-selling is not possible. 
Aside from restrictions on short-
selling, another key assumption that 
Miller makes is that investors have 
different beliefs: Some are innately 
optimistic about the firm, while 
others are pessimistic. note that this 
is not just a matter of the optimists 
having different information about 
the firm than the pessimists. There 
is some empirical support for this 
connection between differences in 
opinions and overvaluation. A study 
by Karl Diether, christopher Malloy, 
and Anna Scherbina finds that stocks 
for which there is wide dispersion in 
analysts’ forecasts subsequently tend 
to perform badly, perhaps reflecting 
overpricing at the time of the forecasts. 
19 See, for example, the article “bringing Down 
bear Stearns” in the August 2008 issue of 
Vanity Fair. 
20 An “emergency order” promulgated in release 
number 34-58166 (July 15, 2008).
21 Sec Rule 10b-21.
22 Sec Temporary Rule 204T, effective from 
September 18, 2008 – July 31, 2009. Prior to 
this, broker-dealers had 13 days in which to 
close out fails.
Another outcome 
of the current crisis 
has been a decline 
in the amount of 
securities available 
for borrowing.
23 Release number 34-58592.
24 For example, the UK, Australia, Korea, and 
Taiwan. Most of the countries that imposed 
bans eliminated or relaxed them within several 
months, although Australia’s ban was extended 
at least through March 2009.
25 On September 18, 2008, the Sec required 
institutional investment managers with assets 
under management of at least $100 million 
(including hedge funds) to report their short-
sales weekly; this requirement is set to expire 
on August 1, 2009. Meeker notes that a similar 
reporting requirement was instituted by the 
nySe during the First World War.
26 As reported in the Wall Street Journal on 
October 20, 2008, the losses were incurred 
because the banks that were managing the 
programs invested the cash collateral in 
securities backed by subprime mortgages.  Business Review  Q2  2009   15 www.philadelphiafed.org
in another study, Michael 
harrison and David Kreps argue that 
the overvaluation may be even more 
dramatic than that suggested by Miller. 
They show that restricting short-sales 
will lead the price of the security to 
exceed the valuation that even the 
most optimistic investor attaches to 
it today. The reason is that investors 
anticipate that, at some point in the 
future, someone else may be even more 
optimistic about the stock than they 
are. This is even true for the investor 
who is most optimistic about the 
stock’s fundamental value today.27 he 
knows that he may be able to sell the 
stock for more than its fundamental 
value at some point in the future, and 
thus he will be willing to pay a little 
bit more than this value today. As for 
Miller, restrictions on short-sales are 
necessary for this to occur because 
otherwise those investors who believe 
that the asset is currently priced above 
its fundamental value would sell it 
short. like Miller’s model,  harrison 
and Kreps’s model also assumes that 
investors disagree about the value of 
the asset. 
but why would investors disagree 
about the value of the security? 
neither Miller nor harrison and 
Kreps specify the reasons for this. 
however, José Scheinkman and Wei 
Xiong suggest that one reason may be 
investor overconfidence. in particular, 
if investors put more weight on their 
own information than on others’, they 
may form different opinions about 
the value of the asset, even when 
evaluating the same information. 
Scheinkman and Xiong then show that 
this can lead to overpricing.
Owen lamont and Richard 
Thaler present several cases of 
overvaluation facilitated by difficulty 
in short-selling. One very prominent 
example is that of Palm and 3com. 
On March 1, 2000, 3com sold a small 
(5 percent) stake in its subsidiary 
Palm through an initial public offering 
(iPO) while retaining the rest (this 
is an example of an equity carve-out). 
The company also announced that it 
would give the remaining Palm shares 
to 3com shareholders by the end of 
the year in a spin-off; in particular, 
each 3com shareholder would receive 
approximately 1.5 shares of Palm. This 
transaction is illustrated in the figure 
on page 16.
how did the market price this 
transaction? On the day of the iPO, 
Palm closed at $95 a share, while 
3com closed below $82. That is, even 
though each 3com shareholder had 
the right to receive 1.5 shares of Palm, 
3com shares traded well below Palm’s. 
This meant that the implied value 
of 3com, less the Palm shares that 
were to be distributed, was actually 
negative!28 clearly, Palm’s shares were 
vastly overpriced relative to 3com’s.
how could one exploit this 
overvaluation? if short-selling Palm 
were possible, there would be a clear 
profit opportunity: to buy one share 
of 3com and short 1.5 shares of Palm, 
and use the Palm shares received (by 
the end of the year) to close out the 
short position. This would give a profit 
of [95×1.5]-82 = $60 today, with a 
further possible profit from the residual 
3com value after the remaining Palm 
shares were spun off.
Arbitragers were not able to 
exploit this mispricing because, as a 
practical matter, it was very difficult to 
borrow Palm shares. Thus, the frenzy 
for tech stocks allowed this overpricing 
of Palm shares to persist for months.29 
however, Geczy, Musto, and Reed 
argue that Palm is an unusual case. 
They show that most tech stocks 
were not that difficult to short in 
practice, and so this cannot provide an 
explanation for the broad-based tech-
stock bubble of the late 1990s.
in another paper, Owen lamont 
examines a sample of 300 firms that 
tried to fight short-selling, for example, 
by publicly attacking short-sellers or by 
taking legal action. he shows that their 
stock prices tended to subsequently 
perform worse than the market, which 
also suggests overvaluation may be 
facilitated by impediments to short-
selling.
Short-Sale Constraints and the 
Revelation of Information. A key 
role of prices in financial markets is to 
aggregate dispersed information.30 For 
example, if an investor has negative 
information about a company’s 
prospects, he may short-sell that stock 
If investors put more weight on their own 
information than on others’, they may form 
different opinions about the value of the asset, 
even when evaluating the same information.
27 The fundamental value of a security may be 
defined as the present value of the security’s 
future cash flows.
28 As lamont and Thaler point out, this is 
particularly surprising given that 3com had 
ample holdings of cash and profitable ongoing 
operations.
29 lamont and Thaler show that this overpricing 
did diminish over time and in most cases was 
eliminated by the time the actual date of the 
distribution was announced.
30 An early exposition of this idea is featured in 
Friedrich hayek’s critique of socialism.16   Q2  2009 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
FIGURE
The Palm Equity Carve-Out
if there are no restrictions on short-
selling. in order to clear the market, 
the stock price must fall, and this 
will alert other investors to the fact 
that the company may be troubled. 
As Douglas Diamond and Robert 
Verrecchia demonstrate, this role 
may be compromised by short-sale 
restrictions.
Diamond and Verrecchia show 
that even if short-sales are restricted, 
prices will not be biased upward; 
that is, shares will not be overvalued 
(unlike in the studies by Miller and 
harrison and Kreps). The reason is 
that in Diamond and Verrecchia’s 
model, investors differ only in the 
information they possess. They are 
all equally innately optimistic (or 
pessimistic) about the company’s 
prospects and — had they all had 
access to the same information 
— would all come to the same 
conclusion about the firm’s value.  
While constraints on short-selling do 
affect the ability of those investors 
who possess negative information to 
trade on that information, market 
participants understand this. So when 
the market observes thin trading, it 
will infer that there is a reasonable 
chance that negative information 
exists concerning this stock; this will 
lead to a reduction in its price.
nevertheless, Diamond and 
Verrecchia point out that since lack 
of trade is a less informative signal of 
low firm quality than actual selling 
pressure, short-sale constraints will 
have a negative effect on the speed of 
information transmission: They slow 
the rate at which information becomes 
public. Although Diamond and 
Verrecchia do not model this, this slow 
transmission of information could lead 
to inefficient investments by allowing 
bad firms to survive for longer than 
they should.
in a recent paper, Arturo bris, 
William Goetzmann, and ning Zhu 
Shareholders implicitly own 100% of Palm through their 3Com shares.
3Com without Palm
Palm
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compare stock market regulation 
around the world and find that prices 
do indeed seem to incorporate negative 
information more slowly in those 
countries where short-sales are either 
not allowed or not practiced, providing 
empirical support for Diamond and 
Verrecchia’s model. 
WHEN DOES RESTRICTING 
SHORT-SALES MAKE SENSE?
The models presented above 
highlight the important role played by 
short-sales.  nevertheless, we do see 
cases in which governments restrict 
them. What might be the rationale for 
doing so? 
A paper by itay Goldstein and 
Alexander Guembel provides one 
possible justification for short-sale 
restrictions.31 Their work can be 
viewed as a model of bear raids, and 
it also provides an explanation of why 
restricting short-sales will prevent 
such raids. They argue that restricting 
short-sales can prevent manipulation of 
stock prices by investors. The reason is 
that, by selling large amounts of stock, 
a short-seller can force the price of the 
firm down, because other investors 
(who are not fully informed about the 
firm) may interpret this selling pressure 
as reflecting negative information 
about the firm’s prospects. Once the 
price has fallen, the short-seller can 
close out his position at a profit; thus 
to the extent that this strategy is self-
fulfilling, it will be profitable for the 
short-seller. 
The particular case they study 
is one in which the low stock price 
may convince the firm’s management 
that its prospects are poorer than 
they previously believed, so that the 
firm forgoes profitable investment 
opportunities, thereby lowering its 
value. however, they also discuss 
another interpretation of their model, 
one in which the low stock price 
affects the firm’s access to other 
sources of financing (for example, 
investors may be reluctant to extend 
the firm credit or may demand more 
collateral on outstanding derivative 
contracts) and may thus force the firm 
into bankruptcy. This interpretation 
formalizes the view — expressed in the 
popular press — that bear raids may 
have contributed to the recent collapse 
of some financial institutions (such as 
bear Stearns).
intuitively, this provides a 
rationale for restricting short-sales. 
in addition, Goldstein and Guembel 
point out that, rather than banning 
short-sales altogether, it may be better 
to make them more costly in some 
manner. The reason is that in their 
model short-selling is more profitable 
for those who truly have negative 
information about a firm than for 
those attempting to manipulate its 
stock price. Thus, the latter group 
may be discouraged when short-selling 
becomes more expensive, without 
undermining the market’s role in 
aggregating information about the 
firm. This is not discussed in their 
article, but many current regulations 
have this effect, such as the less 
favorable tax treatment of short-sale 
profits (they are considered income 
rather than capital gains), and 
restrictions on naked short-selling 
(since, as we have seen, borrowing 
stock can be costly).
CONCLUSION
Short-selling plays a valuable 
economic role in preventing 
overvaluation of securities and 
facilitating the incorporation of 
negative information about a company 
into its stock price. This role is 
supported by empirical studies. 
but under certain conditions, 
short-selling can also be used to 
manipulate the market. by selling large 
amounts of stock, a short-seller may be 
able to convince other investors and 
lenders that the company’s prospects 
are poor, thereby shutting off its access 
to outside financing and forcing it 
into bankruptcy. This also provides an 
argument for regulations that make 
short-sales more costly or difficult, 
since such costs make manipulation 
more difficult, while still allowing 
those with truly negative information 
about the company to profit. Further 
work is also needed on evaluating 
the tradeoff between the positive and 
negative effects of these regulations, 
as well as on better understanding the 
securities lending market. B R 
31 See the article by yaron leitner for further 
discussion of Goldstein and Guembel’s model.REFERENCES
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